

(2)  
(2)

SECRET

This document consists of 18 pages.  
No. 5 of 8 copies. Series A.

~~SECRET~~

WEST GERMAN REACTIONS TO THE BERLIN WALL  
AND TO THE AMERICAN RESPONSE,  
August 1961

Research Project No. 655  
December 1963

Historical Studies Division  
Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs  
Department of State

SECRET

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification.

SECRET

# FOREWORD

This study was requested by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to the President. Mr. Schlesinger, in his memorandum of request, referred to recent assertions by former West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that American timidity had permitted the erection of the Berlin Wall; he requested an analysis of comments and proposals made by the West Germans at the time the Wall was put up and in the immediately succeeding weeks.

The work on this paper was done by Arthur G. Kogan of the Historical Studies Division.

SECRET

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

SECRET

### Summary

The decisive blocking of contact between East and West Berlin by the Communists in August 1961, highlighted by the erection of the Berlin Wall, produced among the people and leaders of West Germany and West Berlin demands for counter-measures not limited to "paper protests". Alleged failure of the Three Western Powers to react with the necessary speed and vigor led to a crisis of confidence which was particularly acute in West Berlin.

The demands which the Germans made publicly, however, were far stronger than those which the Federal German Government formally presented to the Allied Governments. While the West German press and public opinion clamored for stern action in response to the Soviet-East German challenge, and Chancellor Adenauer publicly recommended the adoption of economic countermeasures and even hinted at a possible economic blockade by NATO against the entire Soviet Bloc (including a ban on the Federal Republic's trade with East Germany), the Germans never urged the adoption of such far-reaching measures before the appropriate quadripartite bodies. They did raise at a quadripartite ambassadorial meeting in Washington the possibility of a restriction on German interzonal trade, but they were quick to admit that this was a serious counter-measure which, it had been agreed, should be reserved for the event of interference with access to West Berlin. The only demand officially pressed by the Federal Republic was for a complete ban on the issuance of the Temporary Travel Documents (TTD's) required for East German travel to NATO countries. This demand was partially met: the Western Powers adopted a selective ban on TTD's which was concurred in by all the NATO members.

The people of West Berlin were of course more excited and more eager for strong measures than the rest of the West German population, and this was reflected in the words and actions of their leaders. Mayor Brandt and the Berlin Senate demanded and obtained Allied support for various local measures against East German activities in West Berlin, but Brandt's proposals to President Kennedy, particularly the demand for proclamation of a Three Power status for West Berlin, were not accepted.

The visit of Vice President Johnson and General Clay to West Berlin on August 19-20, coupled with the strengthening of the

Allied

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

Allied garrisons, succeeded in overcoming the crisis of confidence in West Germany and West Berlin. After that the only concern expressed by the Federal Republic with respect to the sealing off of the Soviet Sector was the prevention of similar unilateral actions by the Soviet Union in the future which could affect interests not explicitly covered by Western guarantees to Berlin.

Even at the height of the crisis the responsible leaders of the Federal Republic, possibly with a view to the elections of September 17, were clearly anxious not to agitate the citizens of Germany. They refrained from emphasizing the seriousness of the conflict with the Soviet Union and from following the example of the Western Allies in taking measures of military preparedness. At no time did they (or the responsible leaders of West Berlin) propose that the Western Powers or the United States alone tear down the wall or reverse by military force the situation created by the East German measures of August 13-23.

SECRET

SECRET

Sealing Off of East Berlin, August 13-23, 1961

The sealing off of East Berlin by means of the Soviet-backed East German measures of August 13-23, 1961 was part of a series of Soviet actions and threats that followed President Kennedy's meeting with Premier Khrushchev in Vienna, June 2-4, all of which were calculated to produce an atmosphere of crisis over Berlin. The most conspicuous and dramatic of the East German measures in sealing off the Soviet Sector of the city was the erection of the Berlin Wall.

The first drastic measures, on August 13, were dramatic enough. The Communist authorities posted East German troops and police, assisted by Soviet armor, along the entire border between the Soviet Sector and the Western Sectors; they erected barbed wire barricades and similar obstacles; they drastically curtailed the number of crossing points between East and West Berlin; and they halted direct subway and elevated transit. They also prohibited East Berlin residents from holding jobs in West Berlin and required that they obtain East German permits if they wanted to enter the Western Sectors. Two days later, on August 15, they required special permits for West Berlin vehicles entering East Berlin and cut East Berlin's telephone communications with West Berlin and West Germany.

Then came the Wall: on August 17 the Communists began replacing the temporary barbed wire barricades by concrete slabs, until eventually a five-foot high concrete structure stood between the two halves of the city. To insulate their Sector further, on August 21 they removed to new locations East Berlin residents living in houses next to the Sector border and barricaded those houses to prevent their further use. Finally, on August 23, they required East German permits for West Berlin citizens visiting East Berlin and further reduced to seven the number of border crossings.

The new controls all but stopped the movement of persons between East and West Berlin and by the same token closed an escape hatch for the inhabitants of the Soviet zone. West Germany at the time was in the last weeks of a Bundestag election campaign, in which Chancellor Adenauer and his Christian Democratic party were challenged by the Social Democratic opposition led by Willy Brandt, Governing Mayor of West Berlin. That circumstance may have affected the Federal Republic's reactions to the East German moves.

First

SECRET

SECRET

### First Reactions in the Federal Republic

The introduction of new controls at the Sector borders produced a wave of fury and indignation among the people of West Germany and West Berlin. Demands for Allied countermeasures and retaliatory measures were expressed by newspapers and public figures, and very soon public anger turned against the Western Allies because no immediate countermeasures were forthcoming. There was considerable criticism, too, of Secretary Rusk's statement of August 13, which, while denouncing the restriction of travel within Berlin as being in flagrant violation of existing rights, nevertheless emphasized that Allied access to Berlin was unaffected by the East German decrees. The Secretary's announcement that vigorous protest would be made through appropriate channels was regarded as insufficient by German public opinion, and there was also criticism that even this protest was not made until August 15.<sup>1</sup>

The leaders of West Germany were undoubtedly under strong pressure of public opinion to take action. On August 14 Foreign Minister von Brentano suggested to the American, British, and French Ambassadors that measures be taken at once, if only to deter the Soviet Union and the East German regime from making further encroachments which might affect access to West Berlin. Von Brentano suggested that the Three Western Commandants in Berlin lodge an immediate protest, to be followed by protest notes from the Three Powers to the Soviet Government. Brentano furthermore proposed a ban on East German travel. This would involve in practical terms prohibiting or restricting the issuance of Temporary Travel Documents (TTD's) by the Allied Travel Office in West Berlin (ATO), without which East Germans were unable to travel to NATO countries.<sup>2</sup>

A protest went on the next day (August 15) from the Three Western Commandants in Berlin to the Soviet Commandant, and two days later notes from the three Western Governments were handed to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The notes were coordinated in the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington, which had been charged by the Western Foreign Ministers when they met in Paris August 5-8 with formulating policies and devising countermeasures in response to anticipated Soviet moves on Berlin.<sup>3</sup>

### West German Proposals in the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Steering Group

In the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Steering Group the German Ambassador to Washington, Wilhelm Grove, presented von Brentano's

Bonn

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

Bonn proposal for a complete ban on the issuance on TTD's. The United States representative in the Group said that this was a "picayune measure" and that his Government was thinking in terms of more effective steps such as increasing the Allied garrisons in West Berlin and speeding up the planned military buildup of NATO forces. There was also a discussion of other retaliatory measures such as a cut-off of trade and cultural exchanges with the Soviet Bloc, but even at an early stage of the crisis there was general agreement within the Ambassadorial Group that trade countermeasures should be reserved for "more serious developments". The French agreed with the Germans, however, that a complete ban on the issuance of TTD's should be imposed, while the British favored a selective ban. With the Federal Republic continuing to press for speedy action as disappointment mounted in West Germany, the United States after several days accepted a British proposal for a selective ban on the issuance of TTD's, the purpose of which was to preclude travel beneficial to the East German regime but permit such travel by East Germans as Western interests or sympathies suggested. NATO concurrence, which was essential to the implementation of the measure, was obtained at the end of August.<sup>4</sup>

Another proposal made by the Germans in the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group, on August 24, was directed toward a complete boycott of the Leipzig Fair. The United States pointed out that it could not legally prevent participation in this event but that efforts were being made to discourage U.S. and U.K. exhibitors. There was agreement that the NATO representatives of the Four Western Powers should press for a complete boycott of the Leipzig Fair by the NATO countries. The Germans also proposed the introduction of selective restrictions on the Federal Republic's trade with the Soviet Zone. The United States took a reserved attitude toward this proposal, suggested study of the whole relationship between international trade and rights of access to Berlin, and pointed out that the Allies in their planning had always agreed that these restrictions should be reserved for use in the event of more serious violations of such access rights.<sup>5</sup>

#### Chancellor Adenauer's Reactions and Proposals

Chancellor Adenauer, it seems, took no personal initiative with any representative of the U.S. Government with respect to the sealing off of East Berlin during the first few days when popular

emotions

SECRET

emotions were running high in Germany. The Chancellor did, however, make several public statements on this subject, some of them in the course of the West German electoral campaign.

On August 14, at an electoral rally in Bonn, the Chancellor declared that the Western Allies were in agreement on the necessity for effective countermeasures. He also announced that the Federal Republic would examine its economic ties with the Soviet Zone based on the Interzonal Trade Agreement and hinted that all the NATO countries might impose a complete embargo against the Soviet Bloc. Adenauer likewise referred to economic countermeasures to be taken in association with the Allies in a radio address to the inhabitants of the Soviet Zone. In that address Adenauer admonished the people of East Germany "not to undertake anything that could only worsen the situation and not make it better".<sup>6</sup>

It is rather ironic that in this period when German excitement and indignation over the Soviet-supported East German actions reached a peak Adenauer had a seemingly friendly conversation with Soviet Ambassador Smirnov. The communiqué stated that the Chancellor had told the Soviet Ambassador that the Government of the Federal Republic was not taking any steps which would make more difficult relations between the Federal Republic and the USSR, and that the Chancellor had taken the opportunity to express to the Soviet Ambassador his views about the situation in Berlin. According to information obtained by Embassy Bonn from the German Foreign Office, the Soviet Ambassador had conveyed to the Chancellor Premier Khrushchev's great admiration as well as the Soviet Union's desire for a peaceful settlement of the Berlin problem. The Chancellor had expressed his appreciation for these sentiments, had stated that he found the Soviet view of the Berlin problem interesting and would study it further, and, finally, had indicated that he would be unable to discuss matters with the Soviet Ambassador until after September 17, i.e., the date of the elections.<sup>7</sup>

At an electoral rally in Bonn on August 16 Adenauer read the communiqué of his conversation with the Soviet Ambassador and then discussed the Berlin situation. He emphasized the necessity for absolute unity with the Allies and in this context criticized severely statements in the West German press saying or implying "that the Western Allies were soft or divided on Berlin." The Chancellor assured his audience that the Western Powers were watching the situation closely and had planned carefully for various contingencies.<sup>8</sup>

#### Reactions



SECRET

### Reactions in West Berlin

From the very beginning the citizens of embattled West Berlin had, of course, reacted most strongly to the new East German challenge and to the alleged failure of the Allies to respond to it quickly and effectively.

As early as August 13 Governing Mayor Willy Brandt had demanded vigorous steps and had asked the Allies to insist that the illegal measures imposed by the East German regime be nullified and freedom of movement within Berlin be restored. He emphasized that mere protests would not suffice.<sup>9</sup> This admonition was reiterated to the Three Western Commandants by Mayor Amrehn on behalf of the Berlin Senate on August 14. Amrehn declared that the aroused and indignant Berlin public would not be satisfied with a Commandants' protest and referred to the growing disappointment of the people of West Berlin over Allied failure to take immediate steps. Mayor Amrehn said that the Berlin Senate was under heavy pressure to take local measures, such as steps against the activities of the Communist party (SED) in West Berlin and a ban on the propaganda displays of the East German regime in the S-Bahn stations. The Department of State quickly authorized complying with the latter request of the Berlin Senate on the understanding that it would not result in any public incidents.<sup>10</sup>

As criticism of the Allies and even of the Federal Republic for alleged failure to act continued in West Berlin, the U.S. Mission felt that the people of the city, for the first time since the imposition of the blockade, were in the grip of a real "crisis of confidence".<sup>11</sup> Governing Mayor Willy Brandt made himself the spokesman of this discontent in a letter which he addressed to President Kennedy on August 16.

### Brandt's Proposals to President Kennedy

In his letter to the President, Brandt declared that the East German measures of August 13 had destroyed the remnants of the Four Power Status in Berlin while the Allied Commandants had limited themselves to a "delayed and not very vigorous step". Warning that this development had aroused doubts as to the determination of the Three Western Powers and their ability to react, Brandt stated that inactivity and a more defensive posture could bring about a crisis of confidence in the Western Powers and, on the other hand, boost the self-confidence of the East German regime. The

Governing

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

Governing Mayor proposed that the Western Powers, while insisting on re-establishment of Four-Power responsibilities, should reiterate the guarantee of their presence in West Berlin and, if necessary, have this supported by plebiscites in West Germany and West Berlin. Brandt, furthermore, suggested that the Western Powers should on their own initiative bring the Berlin problem before the United Nations on the grounds that the Soviet Union had violated human rights by its actions in Berlin. Brandt conceded that the steps suggested by him could not produce any significant material change in the situation but stated that it was all the more important to demonstrate political initiative. Brandt declared that he would also welcome a strengthening of the American garrison in Berlin.<sup>12</sup>

#### Concern of United States Representatives in Germany

The United States representatives in Germany continued to voice concern as to the effect of events in Berlin on the spirit of the German people. Ambassador Dowling expressed the fear that further dramatic changes in Berlin, even if they only reflected the "realities" of the situation, i.e., Communist control of East Germany and East Berlin, could endanger public support for the foreign policy of the Federal Republic and result in a radical reorientation of that policy. The Ambassador was confident, however, that feelings in the Federal Republic would calm down provided such measures as a ban on the issuance of ITD's and a strengthening of the Berlin garrison were carried out. The Ambassador was much more disturbed over the crisis of confidence in Berlin, and he endorsed a suggestion advanced by the Director of USIA, Edward R. Murrow, that the "psychological climate" in West Berlin should be "corrected". In a telegram from Berlin, Murrow had proposed a series of steps which "need not necessarily affect the substance of our position" but which would "evidence our interest and support" and had emphasized that the Allies were not being asked to do anything unreasonable as everybody was aware of the "ring of Soviet military forces" around Berlin.<sup>13</sup>

#### Allied Steps to Bolster Berlin Morale: President's Reply to Brandt

To demonstrate Western determination and to prevent further deterioration of German morale, the United States and its Allies put into operation a number of measures some of which had been under consideration in the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group. The United States announced on August 18 that it would send a battle

group

SECRET

SECRET

- 9 -

group of 1500 men to strengthen the West Berlin garrison, and the British took parallel measures. President Kennedy also decided to send Vice President Johnson as his personal representative to Berlin, accompanied by General Clay and Ambassador Bohlen. Mayor Brandt received advance information of these measures and was also told that the Vice President would bring along from the President a reply to Brandt's letter.<sup>14</sup>

In his letter the President told Brandt that "there are no steps available to us which can force a significant material change in the situation", that this "brutal border closing" represented a basic Soviet decision "which only war could reverse", and that nobody had ever supposed "that we should go to war on this point." The President declared that the situation was too serious for "inadequate responses and that most measures proposed, including those in Brandt's letter, were "mere trifles compared with what has been done." The President felt that a significant reinforcement of the Berlin garrison was the best immediate response as it would underline that the Allies would not be removed from Berlin. Of even greater importance would be a continued and accelerated build-up of Western military strength. With respect to Brandt's proposal to proclaim a Three Power status for West Berlin, the President declared that it would imply a weakening of the Four Power relationship "on which our opposition to the border closing depends" and that he did not believe that the Allies should then take such a "double-edged step." The President agreed with Brandt, however, that the Western guarantees for West Berlin should be affirmed and expressed himself in favor of an "appropriate plebiscite" demonstrating West Berlin's link with the West. Finally, he reminded Brandt that, as painful as was the violation of Berlin's important ties with the East, nevertheless the life of West Berlin ran primarily in the direction of the West, economically, morally, and in the field of military security.<sup>15</sup>

#### Effects of the Vice President's Visit and of Allied Military Measures

The Vice President's two-day visit to Bonn and Berlin (August 19-20), in the course of which he expressed the determination of the United States to honor its commitments regarding Berlin, as well as the arrival on August 20 of the promised U.S. Army battle group in the city brought about a significant improvement in West German morale.<sup>16</sup> Ambassador Dowling, in commenting on this change, remarked, moreover, that a note of relief that the situation

had

SECRET

SECRET

- 10 -

had not got out of hand was clearly detectable in the Federal Republic. The West German politicians, he reported, after initial expressions of wrath and indignation, had failed to advocate strong counter-measures as the week went on, and they were much relieved "that the tremendous display of U.S. solidarity and concern for Berlin's freedom" had removed the pressure from the Bonn Government. The Ambassador related the Berlin situation to German domestic politics when he wrote that Adenauer and the CDU were irritated at the fact that Brandt had stolen the headlines during the last few days and that the Chancellor resented anything that distracted the voters from what he considered the main issue, namely, the choice between his leadership and that of the Social Democratic opposition headed by Mayor Brandt.<sup>17</sup>

Whatever the tensions between Adenauer and Brandt, neither man hesitated to express his satisfaction and gratification over Vice President Johnson's visit. Adenauer in particular made a point of telling the Vice President that the recent reproaches of the U.S. administration and especially of President Kennedy were completely unjustified, and he referred to his appearance at an election rally on August 18 when he had told the crowd that it was unjust to express any doubt that the United States would honor its commitments. Drawing the Vice President's attention to the enthusiastic greeting which he received on his arrival in Bonn, the Chancellor remarked sarcastically that the only sign which read "action, not words" was held by an elderly spinster with whom he personally would not want to have either action or words. Adenauer also told the Vice President on that occasion that he had considered using interzonal trade as a weapon of retaliation but had eventually decided against it because of the link between this trade and access to Berlin. He informed Johnson, however, that an unofficial boycott of the Leipzig Fair, a severance of relations in the field of sports with the East Zone, and other measures were being undertaken.

Adenauer indicated to the Vice President that he did not think much of Brandt's letter to the President, saying that he himself would not have sent such a letter containing some impossible and impractical proposals.<sup>18</sup>

For his part, Mayor Brandt in a letter of August 22 expressed thanks to President Kennedy for the decisions he had taken and stated that it was of vital importance that the President had

reiterated

SECRET

SECRET

- 11 -

"reiterated the American pledges for West Berlin in such an unmistakable way." Brandt expressed himself in the same manner in an address broadcast over RIAS on August 22.<sup>19</sup>

Aftermath of the Vice President's Visit to Berlin

By the time the Vice President and his party left Berlin the crisis of confidence which had gripped West Germany and West Berlin after August 13 had largely been overcome and the wave of indignation over alleged Allied failure to act had subsided. The Three Western Powers, too, had realized the importance of quick and dramatic action in Berlin even if the basic element of the situation could not be changed. This was clearly shown on August 22 and 23 when the East German regime completed the process of sealing off East Berlin by requiring citizens of West Berlin to have permits to visit East Berlin, by restricting foreign nationals (including Allied military and civilian personnel) to specific crossing points, and by warning people to keep a distance of 100 meters on both sides of the Sector border. The Three Commandants, in addition to issuing a protest, decided to deploy Allied military units in a 100-meter zone on both sides of the border. Mayor Brandt immediately expressed his appreciation for the decisions taken.<sup>20</sup> Also, the Commandants gave their approval when the Berlin Senate expressed the desire to retaliate by taking various local measures-- e.g., closing travel offices the East Germans had newly set up at the S-Bahn stations for the purpose of issuing permits for travel into East Berlin; controlling the entry of "undesirables" (i.e., SED Party officials) into West Berlin; and closing SED offices in West Berlin.<sup>21</sup> the Western

On August 26, before departing on a short trip to Germany, Ambassador Greve told Secretary Rusk that his Government was anxious that something further be done to strengthen morale in West Berlin and West Germany. The Secretary replied that first it was necessary to start from a clear concept of Berlin morale. He felt it to be unfortunate that the West Berliners by focusing on the situation in East Berlin were permitting the undermining of those important components of West Berlin morale to which the West was completely committed. Greve explained that too precise a definition of those Western interests which would be defended by military action could provide a dangerous area for Soviet nibbling which could undermine the essential bases of West

Berlin.

SECRET

SECRET

- 12 -

Berlin. Greve further pointed out that the West Berliners were unable to distinguish between Western acceptance of the closing of the Sector borders and other rights which had been stressed.<sup>22</sup>

The conversation between the Secretary and Greve indicated that the Federal Republic's main concern with respect to the Berlin Wall was not to reverse past events, but rather to prevent future unilateral actions by the Soviet Union that would not touch those vital interests the Western Powers had pledged to defend but would further depress Berlin morale. This was brought out even more clearly on the occasion of Greve's return to the United States when he handed the President a letter from Chancellor Adenauer.

Adenauer's letter of August 29

The Chancellor's letter to the President dealt mostly with the problem of negotiations on Berlin with respect to which there were considerable differences within the Western camp. But the Chancellor's letter also expressed concern over the danger of "future unilateral actions", before or during the envisaged negotiations, and he declared that "acquiescence in any further acts of force such as occurred in Berlin on August 13 and thereafter is utterly out of the question." Therefore, Adenauer stated, it was imperative to make a fresh study of countermeasures against any threat "not as yet to access to Berlin or to the integrity of West Berlin territory but to the implicit rights and interests of the citizens of West Berlin."<sup>23</sup>

The President's Exchange with Greve, August 30

When Greve handed Adenauer's letter to President Kennedy, the President said that he was aware that there had been some disenchantment at the inability of the Allies to hit back vigorously after the Soviet sealing off of East Berlin. However, the President stated, the countermeasures proposed by Brandt were wholly inadequate responses, and he was in any event more concerned over a possible harassment of civilian air access to Berlin by the Soviet Union and East Germans. He felt it to be urgent that appropriate countermeasures against any such move be readied. Greve declared in this connection that his Government felt that future countermeasures might be taken earlier with respect to a whole range of Soviet harassments which fell short of touching on vital interests. The Ambassador mentioned that there had been

SCMG

SECRET

SECRET

- 13 -

some differences between the Germans and their Allies in the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group regarding countermeasures in the field of international trade. Yet he admitted that even the Germans had to agree that such countermeasures were instruments of considerable importance which should not be used lightly. Finally, as he had done in his conversation with the Secretary on August 26, Greve emphasized that the definition of vital interests could be an invitation to the Soviet Union to try aggression in sectors not covered by the definition.

Summing up that portion of his discussion with Greve, the President declared that a careful examination of possible Soviet countermeasures was necessary and that a Soviet attack on non-vital areas should be met by non-vital responses.<sup>24</sup> The President made the same point in his letter of reply to Adenauer when he wrote that "we must carefully prepare a series of selected responses to various harassments."<sup>25</sup>

It is perhaps worth noting that at a meeting of the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group, when Greve expressed the Federal Republic's concern lest the West fail to take appropriate counteraction against future Soviet harassments, he admitted that his own Government was not entirely free to act during the Bundestag election campaign. He said, however, that his Government was preparing measures, including measures in the field of military preparedness, for implementation after September 17, the date of the elections.<sup>26</sup>

#### End of Serious Discussions Regarding the Berlin Wall

The foregoing exchanges, for all practical purposes, ended inter-Allied discussions concerning the Berlin Wall. Subsequent U.S.-German and quadripartite talks on Berlin dealt with countermeasures against future Soviet threats to access to West Berlin as well as with the problem of establishing a negotiating position for talks with the Soviet Union. The Germans advanced no proposals with respect to the Berlin Wall at the Western Foreign Ministers' meeting held in Washington September 14-16 or at Chancellor Adenauer's conferences with President Kennedy, November 22-23.

#### Conclusion

In a report of September 13, 1961, the American Embassy at Bonn evaluated the dramatic events which had begun exactly one

month

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

- 14 -

month earlier when East German police and troops appeared at the crossing points between East and West Berlin to enforce the edicts of the Ulbricht regime. The Embassy emphasized again that Vice President Johnson's visit had largely dispelled the crisis of confidence which had developed from what were considered insufficiently strong Western reactions to the Communist moves. But the Embassy also pointed out that even the West Berlin leaders on more sober reflection admitted that interference with the closing of the crossing points might have created a highly dangerous situation, although many Berlin residents still believed that the appearance of Allied armor "on short order" might have acted as a deterrent to the Communists. As a minimum, the people of Berlin had expected action against the East German trade missions in the NATO countries. However, the Embassy declared, they were no less critical of Adenauer at the height of the crisis, than of the Western leaders, "singling out his failure to appear in Berlin" and his "apparently polite exchange" with the Soviet Ambassador, which was considered evidence that the Chancellor was belittling the crisis in order not to be compelled to admit failure of his policy before the elections.<sup>27</sup>



SECRET

- 15 -

FOOTNOTES

1. From Bonn, tel. 335, Aug. 15, 1961, official use only; tel. 343, Aug. 16, confidential; Documents on Germany, 1944-1961 (Senate Committee print, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961), p. 725.
2. From Bonn, tel. 318, Aug. 14, 1961, secret.
3. To Moscow, tel. 438, Aug. 15, and tel. 441, Aug. 16, both secret; Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 726-727.
4. To Bonn, tel. 350, Aug. 14, 1961, and tel. 356, Aug. 15, both secret; tel. 390, Aug. 21, confidential; to Paris, tel. 1004, Aug. 21, secret; from Bonn, tel. 363, Aug. 17, secret, and tel. 423, Aug. 25, confidential; from Paris, tel. POLTO 247, Aug. 31, confidential; to Moscow, tel. 460, Aug. 17, secret.
5. To Paris, tels. 1050 and 1077, Aug. 24, both secret.
6. From Bonn, tel. 319, Aug. 14, 1961, and tel. 335, Aug. 15, both official use only.
7. From Bonn, tel. 336, Aug. 17, 1961, secret; Heinrich Sigler, Von der gescheiterten Gipfelkonferenz Mai 1960 bis zur Berlinsperre August 1961 (Bonn-Zürich-Berlin, 1961), p. 102.
8. From Bonn, tel. 350, Aug. 17, official use only.
9. From Berlin, tel. 187, Aug. 13, secret
10. From Berlin, tel. 197, Aug. 14, confidential; to Berlin, tel. 122, Aug. 15, confidential.
11. From Berlin, tel. 210, Aug. 15, confidential.
12. Letter, Brandt to Kennedy, Aug. 16, 1961, sent as tel. 223 from Berlin, Aug. 16, confidential. Although the letter was to be confidential, it was published in the German press through indiscretion.
13. From Bonn, tel. 354, Aug. 17, 1961, secret; from Berlin, tel. 217, Aug. 16, confidential.

SECRET

SECRET

- 16 -

14. To London, tel. 845, Aug. 19, 1961, and to Berlin, tel. 135, Aug. 17, both secret.
15. Letter, Kennedy to Brandt, Aug. 18, 1961, secret.
16. For text of the Vice President's statements in Bonn and Berlin August 18-20, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 740-744.
17. From Bonn, tel. 337, confidential, Aug. 21, 1961.
18. Memorandum by Cash (EUR) of conversation between Vice President Johnson, Chancellor Adenauer, and others, Aug. 19, 1961, secret.
19. Letter, Brandt to Kennedy, sent as tel. 297, from Berlin, Aug. 23, 1961, official use only; from Berlin, tel. 274, Aug. 22, official use only.
20. Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, p. 753; from Berlin, tel. 285, Aug. 23, 1961, official use only.
21. From Berlin, tel. 295, Aug. 23, 1961; and tel. 339, Aug. 26, both confidential.
22. Memorandum by Hillenbrand (EUR) of conversation between Secretary Fusk and Ambassador Greve, Aug. 26, secret.
23. Letter, Adenauer to Kennedy, Aug. 29, 1961, confidential.
24. Memorandum by Kohler (EUR) of conversation between the President and Ambassador Greve, Aug. 30, 1961, secret.
25. Letter, Kennedy to Adenauer, Sept. 4, 1961, sent as tel. 560 to Bonn, Sept. 4, secret.
26. To Bonn, tel. 505, Aug. 30, 1961, secret.
27. From Bonn, tel. 606, Sept. 13, 1961, secret.

SECRET